Why the Supreme Court Should Give
the Easy Answer to an Easy Question:
A Response to Professors Childress,
Neuborne, Sherry and Silberman
Howard M. Erichson*
None of us thinks that the Supreme Court should affirm the
Ninth Circuit·s ruling that California had general jurisdiction over
DaimlerChrysler. But we differ on the extent to which we think the
Supreme Court should use DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bauman1 to clarify
the law of personal jurisdiction, rather than sidestep the core questions.
And if the Justices are to speak on general jurisdiction, we differ on
exactly what we think they ought to say.
Professors Burt Neuborne and Suzanna Sherry would have the
Court duck the issue on which it granted certiorari, but in different
ways. Professor Neuborne thinks the Court should dismiss the appeal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.2 Professor Sherry, while not
asking the Court to dismiss and not necessarily asking the Court to shy
away from personal jurisdiction questions altogether, urges the court to
avoid the particular issue of whether jurisdiction can rest on the
imputed contacts of a corporate subsidiary.3
In contrast to Professors Sherry and Neuborne, I hope the
Supreme Court will address head-on the personal jurisdiction issues.4
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Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
644 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).
Burt Neuborne, *HQHUDO-XULVGLFWLRQ´&RUSRUDWH6HSDUDWHQHVVµDQGWKH5XOHRI/DZ, 66
VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 95, 97²99 (2013).
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Suzanna Sherry, 'RQ·W$QVZHU7KDW:Ky (and How) the Supreme Court Should Duck
the Issue in DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 111, 114²16 (2013).
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The Court does not lack subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case. Even if the
SODLQWLIIV·IHGHUDOODZFODLPVKDYHEHHQ undermined by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133
S. Ct. 1659 (2013) and Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012), the federal courts
continue to have supplemental jurisdiction over the non-federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(granting supplemental jurisdiction);; 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (giving district court discretion to
dismiss supplemental claims if all federal claims have been dismissed).
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Even after the Court·s unanimous decision in Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations v. Brown,5 too much confusion remains concerning the
standard for general jurisdiction over corporations.6 Little is gained by
keeping lawyers and judges in the dark about jurisdictional limits
(except, perhaps, for the lawyers who litigate these issues and the
academics who write about them). The DaimlerChrysler case offers an
opportunity to shed some light. The issues that need to be addressed,
frankly, are not that complicated.
The heart of the DaimlerChrysler appeal may be resolved with
the following two questions and answers, neither of which should be
terribly controversial after Goodyear. First, what state or states possess
plenary power over a defendant so that the state may exercise
adjudicatory authority without regard to where claims arose? The
obvious answer is the defendant·s home state. For an individual, the
home state is the person·s state of domicile;; for a corporation, it is the
corporation·s state of incorporation and its principal place of business.7
Second, if a defendant is neither incorporated in the forum state nor
maintains its principal place of business there, may a state nonetheless
be considered the defendant·s ´home stateµ for purposes of general
jurisdiction because of the activities of the defendant·s subsidiary acting
as an agent? As I argued in my initial piece, this second question should
be answered in the negative.8
The Supreme Court sometimes faces situations in which it is
wise to avoid a hard issue because the particular case does not tee up
the issue well enough, but DaimlerChrysler is not such a case. The basic
question that the Court needs to address is what the Court meant in its
Goodyear decision concerning the permissible scope of general
jurisdiction over corporations.9 If I am correct that Goodyear
established a home-state test for general jurisdiction, and that home
state means state of incorporation or principal place of business, then

5.
131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
6.
See Sherry, supra note 3, at 118²19 & n.32 and cases cited therein.
7.
In general, a corporation has one principal place of business. As two of us have noted in
this Roundtable, circumstances may justify finding more than one principal place of business for
purposes of general jurisdiction, such as when a corporation maintains dual headquarters or when
its headquarters are separated from its primary operations. See Howard M. Erichson, The Home-
State Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 81, 86²87 (2013);; Sherry,
supra note 3, at 118 n.31.
8.
See Erichson, supra note 7, at 91-92.
9.
In this regard, DaimlerChrysler differs from J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. 2780 (2011). In Nicastro, Justices Breyer and Alito offered a plausible argument for declining
to resolve the highly contentious stream-of-commerce issue on which the Court had split 4-4-1 in
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), because the issue deserves a full
briefing in a case that involves modern forms of commerce. See Nicastro, 480 U.S. at 2791 (Breyer,
J., concurring).
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the answers to the remaining issues³including whether general
jurisdiction may be established on an agency theory based on the
contacts of a corporate subsidiary³follow naturally.
Sherry and Neuborne rightly worry that a Supreme Court
reversal of the Ninth Circuit in DaimlerChrysler could entrench an
outdated conception of corporate personhood.10 Sherry argues that
´setting a high bar for piercing the corporate veil across the board³
including in all jurisdictional contexts³continues and entrenches a
formalist approach to corporate separateness that does not reflect
either the reality or the diversity of corporate forms and that allows
corporations to externalize costs.µ11 But the DaimlerChrysler case does
not require setting a high bar ´across the board³including in all
jurisdictional contexts,µ as Sherry puts it. It simply requires the Court
to say that general jurisdiction depends upon a corporation·s home
state, and that a corporation does not establish a home state through
the contacts of a subsidiary acting as an agent. Contacts through an
agent may be highly relevant to specific jurisdiction, but they do not
establish a home state for purposes of general jurisdiction. As long as
the Court draws a clear distinction between specific jurisdiction and
general jurisdiction, Sherry·s concern about an across-the-board
standard for imputation of contacts is, I hope, misplaced.
Neuborne notes that the question to ask is not a metaphysical
question about where a corporation is ´present,µ but rather ´a
pragmatic question of whether a forum jurisdiction has a legitimate
regulatory interest in asserting adjudicatory authority over a corporate
parent who is using a wholly owned-and-controlled subsidiary to engage
in behavior in the forum jurisdiction that justifies regulation of the
parent.µ12 I agree that the state·s regulatory interest is the correct
inquiry. In presenting this question, however, Neuborne implies that
the state·s regulatory interest may justify general jurisdiction based on
the contacts of a subsidiary acting as an agent. Again, I think the
problem is a failure to account fully for the difference between specific
and general jurisdiction. In specific jurisdiction cases along the lines of
Nicastro,13 the best answer to Neuborne·s question will often be yes.
When a case arises out of the use of a product in a state, the state has
a regulatory interest in asserting adjudicatory authority over a
company that purposefully sold the product into the state, even if it did
so through a subsidiary. In general jurisdiction cases such as
DaimlerChrysler, however, the answer is no. A state does not have a
10.
11.
12.
13.

See Sherry, supra note 3, at 116;; Neuborne, supra note 2, at 99²102.
Sherry, supra note 3, at 116.
Neuborne, supra note 2, at 101.
J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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legitimate regulatory interest in asserting adjudicatory authority over
a foreign company for claims that do not arise out of the company·s
contacts with the forum state. When Neuborne says that ´[n]othing in
Nicastro casts doubt on the existence of in personam jurisdiction over a
foreign automobile manufacturer who uses a wholly owned-and-
controlled subsidiary to sell very large numbers of cars in a given
forum,µ he is correct as long as he is referring to specific jurisdiction,
but not if he is referring to personal jurisdiction over the foreign
manufacturer for claims unrelated to the company·s business in the
forum state.
Assuming the Supreme Court goes forward with addressing
general jurisdiction in DaimlerChrysler, Professors Childress, Sherry,
Silberman and I largely agree on a tight test for general jurisdiction,
but it is worth noting several points of language and emphasis.
Professor Donald Childress and I agree, I think, on what would
constitute a sound rule of general jurisdiction and how that rule should
apply in the DaimlerChrysler case.14 We disagree slightly, however,
about how the Justices ought to engage the question. Childress
encourages the Justices to ask a why question: ´the Justices should ask
the plaintiffs· lawyers why they brought the case in California.µ15 He
lists a number of the reasons why foreign plaintiffs choose to sue in U.S.
forums, offering a helpful account of transnational forum shopping.16
But showing that litigants forum shop is not the same as showing that
it should matter to the Supreme Court in its analysis of the due process
constraints on judicial power. For purposes of personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, does it matter why plaintiffs· lawyers chose a particular
forum? If the district court has power to hear the case (subject matter
jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue), and if the court lacks a basis
for dismissing or transferring as a discretionary matter (forum non
conveniens, venue transfer), then the court must hear the case
regardless of what the court thinks of the plaintiffs· motives in choosing
the forum. And if the court lacks power to hear the case, then the court
must dismiss regardless of the purity of plaintiffs· motives. While
transnational forum shopping provides a vivid backdrop to the
14. See Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction and the Transnational Law Market,
66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC    ´8QOHVVLWLVFOHDUWKDWDFRUSRUDWLRQ·VDIILOLDWHLVUHDOO\
MXVWWKHFRUSRUDWLRQLWVHOILWV¶DOWHUHJR·WKHGHIDXOWUXOHIRUJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQVKRXOGEHWKDWVXLW
is proper only in the corporation·V SULQFLSDO SODFH RI EXVLQHVV RU VWDWH RI LQFRUSRUDWLRQ KHUH
*HUPDQ\ RULQWKHSODFHRIWKHKDUP $UJHQWLQDRUSHUKDSV*HUPDQ\ µ 
15. Id. at 72.
16. See id. at 73 (noting that foreign plaintiffs may prefer U.S. substantive law, notice
pleading, liberal discovery, punitive damages, and civil juries). In addition to the items on
&KLOGUHVV·V OLVW , ZRXOG PHQWLRQ FRQWLQJHQW IHHV WKH $PHULFDQ 5XOH RQ OHJDO IHHV and the
availability of class actions as further reasons why foreign plaintiffs sometimes choose United
States forums.
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DaimlerChrysler case, plaintiffs· motives have no bearing on whether
California lacked general jurisdiction over the defendant.
Professor Sherry invokes the reasonableness prong of personal
jurisdiction as a potential avenue for resolving the case, though it is not
her preferred solution: ´Another good option would be to hold that
regardless of whether DaimlerChrysler has sufficient contacts with
California, it would be unreasonable for a California court to exercise
jurisdiction over it.µ17 While I agree that jurisdiction over
DaimlerChrysler would be unreasonable in this case, I would not want
the Court to go that route. The reasonableness inquiry should have no
place in general jurisdiction analysis because the very point of general
jurisdiction is that the relationship between the defendant and the
forum state gives the state adjudicatory power over the defendant,
without regard to the particulars of the dispute.18
Professor Linda Silberman, taking a comparative approach to
the question of jurisdictional imputation, concludes that imputation of
contacts on an agency theory ordinarily makes sense only for specific
jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction.19 I agree not only with her
conclusion, but also with her reasoning that ´the United States should
strive for harmonization when the rest of the world has the better
policy.µ20 I have tried to show that the home-state test makes sense from
the bottom up, looking at the justification for general jurisdiction
through the lens of the citizen-state relationship.21 Silberman shows
that the home state test, and the rejection of agency-based imputation
for general jurisdiction, make sense from the outside in, by looking at
what is unusual about United States jurisdiction doctrines and asking
whether those divergences are warranted.22
My main difference with Professor Silberman is that I embrace
what she calls the ´rigid dichotomyµ23 between general and specific
jurisdiction. She points to Frummer v. Hilton International24 as a case
17. Sherry, supra note 3, at 119. See also Neuborne, supra note 2, at 105 (noting that,
because of the absence of a regulatRU\LQWHUHVW´LWZRXOGEHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\XQUHDVRQDEOHXQGHU
Asahi WRIRUFH'DLPOHU$*WRGHIHQGWKHDFWVRILWV$UJHQWLQHVXEVLGLDU\LQ&DOLIRUQLDµ 
18. Erichson, supra note 7, at 92²93.
19. See Linda J. Silberman, Jurisdictional Imputation in Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler: A
Bridge Too Far, 66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC    ´>)@RUPRVWgeneral jurisdiction cases,
the contacts of a U.S. subsidiary should be relevant only when the alter ego standard is met. The
more expansive agency or enterprise theories are most appropriate in cases of specific jurisdiction,
DQGSRVVLEO\ DV,ZLOOLOOXVWUDWH LQVRPHQDUURZO\GHILQHGFDVHVRIJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQµ 
20. Id. at 134.
21. Erichson, supra note 7, at 83²85.
22. Silberman, supra note 19;; see also Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro:
2EVHUYDWLRQVIURPD7UDQVQDWLRQDODQG&RPSDUDWLYH3HUVSHFWLYHµSUP.CT. REV. 591 (2012).
23. Id. at 129.
24. 19 N.Y.2d 533 (1967).
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in which general jurisdiction might be warranted by a subsidiary·s
forum-state activity that did not directly give rise to the claim but that
is ´related closely to the business that gave rise to the claim against the
parent.µ25 This raises a valid point about the interest a forum state may
have in asserting power over a defendant;; Silberman presents a more
nuanced account than I offered in my initial piece. A claim may
implicate a state·s regulatory interest even if the state is neither the
defendant·s home state nor a place where the claim arose, if the claim
relates to activity that the defendant conducts in the forum state. But
the problem is that this sort of interest can be so diffuse that it is
difficult to see how it offers a workable test for the assertion of power.
It is true that cases such as Frummer, unlike DaimlerChrysler, may
present plausible connections among the defendant, the claim, and the
forum state. But such connections beyond the defendant·s home state
should not provide an adequate basis for general jurisdiction after
Goodyear. To the extent a court·s assertion of power hinges on the
relatedness of the claim to the forum, the argument ought to depend
more on the logic of specific jurisdiction than general jurisdiction,
although admittedly it has aspects of both. In the end, I agree with
Professor Silberman·s comment that, despite the appeal of a nuanced
functional approach, ´such line-drawing in the category of general
jurisdiction cases may be so difficult that one is moved to constrain
imputation on an agency theory to cases of specific jurisdiction.µ26

25.
26.

Silberman, supra note 19, at 129.
Id. at 132.

